This paper considers the minimization of transmit power in Gaussian frequency-selective interference channels, subject to a rate constraint for each user. To derive decentralized solutions that do not require any cooperation among the users, we formulate this power control problem as a (generalized) Nash equilibrium game. We obtain su cient conditions that guarantee the existence and nonemptiness of the solution set to our problem. Then, to compute the solutions of the game, we propose two distributed algorithms based on the single user water lling solution: The sequential and the simultaneous iterative water lling algorithms, wherein the users update their own strategies sequentially and simultaneously, respectively. We derive a uni ed set of su cient conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of the solution and global convergence of both algorithms. Our results are applicable to all practical distributed multipoint-to-multipoint systems, either wired or wireless, where a quality of service in terms of information rate must be guaranteed for each link.
Introduction and Motivation
The interference channel is a mathematical model relevant to many communication systems such as wireless ad-hoc networks [1, 2] or Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) [3] - [5] , where the distributed nature of the transmit-receive pairs does not permit cooperation at the transmission level. In this paper, we focus on the frequency selective interference channel with additive Gaussian noise. Thus far, the capacity region of the interference channel is still unknown, even for the simplest Gaussian two-user case [6] .
Only some bounds are available (see, e.g., [7] for a summary of the known results about the Gaussian interference channel). A pragmatic approach that leads to an achievable region or inner bound of the capacity region is to restrict the system to operate as a set of independent units, i.e., not allowing multiuser encoding/decoding or the use of interference cancelation techniques. This achievable region is very important in practical systems with limitations on the decoder complexity and simplicity of the system. With this assumption, the multiuser interference is treated as noise and the transmission strategy for each user is simply its power allocation. The system design reduces then to nding the optimal Power Spectral Density (PSD) for the users according to some performance measure.
The results existing in the current literature [4, 5] , [8] - [22] have dealt with the maximization of the information rates of all the links, subject to individual transmit power and (possibly) spectral mask constraints. This rate maximization problem is in principle a multi-objective optimization problem, as the rate achieved by each link constitutes a di erent single objective. In [ 8] - [10] a centralized approach based on duality theory [23, 24] was proposed to characterize the largest achievable rate region of the system (i.e., the Pareto-optimal set of the achievable rates). In these algorithms, the authors aim to solve the Lagrangian dual relaxation of the original weighted sum-rate maximization problem. However, the evaluation of the dual objective function involves a non-concave maximization and the duality gap may not be zero when the multiuser interference is high. Hence, the optimal dual solution can only provide an upper bound on the maximum weighted sum-rate. In [11] , the authors derived su cient conditions for the optimal spectrum sharing strategy maximizing the sum-rate to be frequency division multiple access (FDMA). They also proposed several distributed spectrum allocation algorithms that can approximately maximize the sum-rate.
In [4, 5] , [12] - [22] instead, the authors focused on distributed algorithms with no centralized control; therefore, the system design was recast within the convenient framework of game theory. In particular, the rate maximization problem was formulated as a strategic non-cooperative game, where every link is a player that competes against the others by choosing the transmission strategy that maximizes its own information rate. This changes the original multi-objective optimization problem into a set of single-objective optimization problems coupled together (this coupling is what makes the problem hard to solve). Based on the celebrated notion of Nash Equilibrium (NE) in game theory [25, 34, 35] , an equilibrium for the whole system is reached when every player's reaction is \unilaterally optimal"; i.e., when, given the rival players' current strategies, any change in a player's own strategy would result in a rate loss.
The Nash equilibria of the rate maximization game can be reached using Gaussian signaling and a proper PSD from each user [13, 17, 18] . To obtain the optimal PSD of the users, Yu, Ginis, and Cio proposed the sequential Iterative WaterFilling Algorithm (IWFA) [4] in the context of DSL systems, modeled as Gaussian frequency-selective interference channel. The algorithm is an instance of the Gauss-Seidel scheme [30] : The users maximize their own information rates sequentially (one after the other), according to a xed updating order. The most appealing features of the sequential IWFA are its low-complexity and its distributed nature. In fact, to compute the water lling solution, each user only needs to measure the noise-plus-interference PSD, without requiring speci c knowledge of the power allocations and the channel transfer functions of all other users.
The convergence of the sequential IWFA for the rate maximization problem has been studied in a number of works [4, 5] , [13] - [16] , [18, 19] each time obtaining milder conditions that guarantee convergence. However, despite its appealing properties, the sequential IWFA may su er from slow convergence if the number of users in the network is large because of the sequential updating strategy:
Each user is forced to wait for the updates of all the other users scheduled before it. In addition, the algorithm requires some kind of centralized synchronism to determine the order in which users execute the updates. To overcome these drawbacks, the simultaneous IWFA was proposed in [13] , and then in [17] - [19] , where, at each iteration, all the users update their power allocations simultaneously, rather than sequentially. This reduces the convergence time considerably, specially when the number of active users is large.
The game theoretical formulation proposed in [4, 5] , [12] - [22] is a useful approach to devise totally distributed algorithms. However, due to possible asymmetries of the system and the inherent sel sh nature of the optimization, the Nash equilibria of the rate maximization game in [4, 5] , [12] - [22] may lead to ine cient and unfair rate distributions among the links 1 , even when the game admits a unique NE. This unfairness is due to the fact that, without any additional constraint, the optimal power allocation corresponding to a NE of the game in the cited references is often the one that assigns high rates to the users with the highest (equivalent) channels; which strongly penalizes all the other users.
As many realistic communication systems require prescribed Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees in terms of achievable rate for each user, the system design based on the game theoretic formulation of the rate maximization might not be adequate.
To overcome this problem, in this paper we introduce a new distributed system design, that takes explicitly into account the rate constraints. More speci cally, we propose a novel strategic noncooperative game, where every link is a player that competes against the others by choosing the PSD that attains the desired information rate, with the minimum transmit power. We will refer to this new game as power minimization game. An equilibrium is achieved when every user realizes that, given the current PSD of the others, any change in its own power allocation would result in an increase in transmit power. This equilibrium is referred to as Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) and the corresponding game is called Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem 2 .
The game theoretical formulation proposed in this paper di ers signi cantly from the rate maximization games studied in [4, 5] , [12] - [22] . In fact, di erently from these references, where the users are allowed to choose their own strategies independently from each other, in the power minimization game, the rate constraints induce a coupling among the players' admissible strategies, i.e., each player's strategy set depends on the current strategies of all the other players. This coupling makes the study of the proposed game much harder than that of the rate maximization game and no previous result in [4, 5] , [12] - [22] can be used.
Recently, the calculation of generalized Nash equilibria has been the subject of a renewed attention also in the mathematical programming community, see for example [26] - [29] . Nevertheless, in spite of several interesting advances, none of the game results in the literature are applicable to the power minimization game.
The main contributions of the paper are the following. We provide su cient conditions for the nonemptiness and boundedness of the solution set of the generalized Nash problem. Interestingly, these su cient conditions suggest a simple admission control procedure to guarantee the feasibility of a given rate pro le of the users. We also derive conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE. To compute the generalized Nash solutions, we propose two alternative totally distributed algorithms based on the single user water lling solution: The sequential IWFA and the simultaneous IWFA. The sequential IWFA is an instance of the Gauss-Seidel scheme: The users update their own strategy sequentially, one after the other, according to the single user water lling solution and treating the interference generated 2 According to recent use, we term generalized Nash equilibrium problem a Nash game where the feasible sets of the players depend on the other players' strategy. Such kind of games have been called in various di erent ways in the literature, for example social equilibrium problems or just Nash equilibrium problems.
by the others as additive noise. The simultaneous IWFA is based on the Jacobi scheme: The users choose their own PSD simultaneously, still using the single user water lling solution. Interestingly, even though the rate constraints induce a coupling among the feasible strategies of all the users, both algorithms are still totally distributed. In fact, each user, to compute the water lling solution, only needs to measure the noise-plus-interference power spectral density. It turns out that the conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE are su cient for the convergence of both algorithms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the system model and Section 3 formulates the power minimization problem as a strategic non-cooperative game. Section 4 provides the su cient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a GNE of the power minimization game. Section 5 contains the description of the distributed algorithms along with their convergence conditions. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusions. Proofs of the results are given in the Appendices A{G.
System Model
We consider a Gaussian frequency-selective interference channel composed by multiple links. Aiming at nding distributed algorithms, we focus on transmission techniques where no interference cancelation is performed and multiuser interference is treated as additive colored noise from each receiver.
To deal easily with the frequency-selectivity of the channel, we adopt a multicarrier approach without loss of optimality (since it is a capacity-lossless structure for su ciently large block length [31] - [33] ). The baseband signal model is then (dropping the block index):
where N , f1; : : : ; N g is the set of the N available carriers; k denotes the carrier index; s(k) is a vector with the Q transmitted symbols over carrier k by the Q transmitters, y(k) is a vector with the Q received signals over carrier k by the Q receivers; w(k) is a zero mean circularly symmetric complex Gaussian white noise vector, whose q-th element has variance 2 q (k) =E
of the channel between destination r and source q including the path-loss d rq with exponent and normalized fading H rq (k) (observe that the diagonal elements of H(k) contain the direct channels whereas the o -diagonal elements the interference channels). For each transmitter q, the total average transmit power is (in units of energy per transmitted symbol)
where s q contains the N symbols transmitted by user q on the N carriers,
the power allocated by user q over carrier k:
Given the I/O system in (1), we make the following assumptions:
A.1 Each channel changes su ciently slowly and thus it can be considered xed during the whole transmission, so that the information theoretic results are meaningful;
A.2 The channel from each source to its own destination is known to the intended receiver, but not to the other terminals, and each receiver is assumed to measure with no errors the PSD of the noise plus the interference due to the other links. Based on this information, each destination computes the optimal signaling for its own link and transmits it back to its transmitter through a low bit rate (error-free) feedback channel. 3
A.3 All the users are block-synchronized with an uncertainty at most equal to the cyclic pre x length.
This imposes a minimum length of the cyclic pre x that will depend on the maximum propagation delay spread in the system.
Game Theoretic Formulation
In this section we formulate the design of system (1) within the framework of game theory [34, 35] , using as desirability criterion the concept of GNE, see for example [25, 39] . Speci cally, we consider a strategic non-cooperative game, in which the players are the links and the payo functions are the transmit powers of the users: Each player competes rationally 4 against the others by choosing the signaling (i.e. its strategy) that minimizes its own transmit power, given a constraint on the minimum achievable information rate on the link. A GNE of the game is reached when each user,
given the strategy pro le of the others, does not get any power decrease by unilaterally changing its own strategy, still keeping the rate constraint satis ed.
Given the signal model in (1), the achievable rate for each player q is computed as the maximum information rate on the q-th link, assuming the other received signals as additive noise. It is straightforward to see that a GNE is obtained if each user transmits using Gaussian signaling, with a proper PSD. In fact, for each user, given that all other users use Gaussian codebooks, the optimal codebook 3 In practice, both measurement and feedback are inevitably a ected by errors. This scenario can be studied by extending our formulation to games with partial information [34, 35] , but this goes beyond the scope of the present paper. 4 The rationality assumption means that each user will never chose a strictly dominated strategy. A strategy pro le xq is strictly dominated by zq if q (xq; y q ) < q (zq; y q ) ; for a given admissible y q , (yr) Q r6 =q=1 ; where q denotes the payo function of player q: maximizing mutual information is also Gaussian [32] . Hence, the maximum achievable rate for the q-th user is given by [32] 
with sinr q (k) denoting the Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) on the k-th carrier for the q-th link:
where
and
is the power allocation strategy of user q across the N available subcarriers, whereas p q , (p r ) Q r6 =q contains the strategies of all the other users.
Observe that in the case of practical coding schemes, where only nite order constellations can be used, we can use the gap approximation analysis [36, 37] and write the number of bits transmitted over the N substreams from the q-th source still as in (3) (for a given family of constellations and a given error probability P e;q ), simply replacing jH(k)j 2 in (4) with jH(k)j 2 = q ;where q 1 is the gap.
This gap depends only on the family of constellation and on P e;q ; for M -QAM constellations, for example, if the symbol error probability is approximated by P e;q (sinr
the resulting gap is q = (Q 1 (P e;q =4)) 2 =3 [38] .
In summary, we have the following structure for the game:
where , f1; 2; : : : ; Qg denotes the set of the active links, P q (p q ) R N + is the set of admissible power allocation strategies p q 2 P q (p q ) of user q, across the N available carriers, de ned as
where R q (p q ; p q ) is given in (3), and R ? q denotes the minimum transmission rate required by each user, which we assume positive without loss of generality. In the sequel we will make reference to the
The optimal strategy for the q-th player, given the power allocation of the others, is then the solution to the following minimization problem
where P q (p q ) is given in (7) . Note that, for each q, the minimum in (8) is taken over p q ; for a xed but arbitrary p q : Interestingly, given p q ; the solution of (8) can be obtained in \closed" form via the solution of a singly-constrained optimization problem; see [40] and Appendix A for an algorithm to implement this solution in practice. 
where the water lling operator WF q ( ) is de ned as
with (x) + , max(0; x) and the water-level q chosen to satisfy the rate constraint R q (p ? q ; p q ) = R ? q , with R q (p q ; p q ) given in (3).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The solutions of the game G in (6), if they exist, are the Generalized Nash Equilibria, formally de ned as follows.
De nition 2 A feasible strategy pro le
According to Lemma 1, all the Generalized Nash Equilibria of the game must satisfy the condition expressed by the following Corollary. 
with WF q ( ) de ned in ( 10) .
Given the nonlinear system of equations (12), the fundamental questions we want an answer to are: i) Does a solution exist, for any given users' rate pro le? ii) If a solution exists, is it unique? iii)
How can such a solution be reached in a totally distributed way?
An answer to the above questions is given in the forthcoming sections.
Related Works
The game theoretic formulation proposed in (8) di ers from the more widely studied power control problems in communication networks [41] - [51] , [4, 5] - [22] , in the key aspects detailed next.
A traditional approach for power control in at-fading CDMA (or TDMA/FDMA) wireless networks (either cellular or ad-hoc) is to provide desired QoS to the users (e.g., requirements in terms of the average BER, rate, delay, etc.) with a minimum total transmit power [41] - [46] . These problems fall in the class of so-called scalar problems, since each user has only one variable to optimize (the transmit power). Thereby, each QoS requirement can be expressed in terms of the desired SINR at the receiver output of each user [41] - [50] ; which leads to an expression of the QoS constraints through a system of linear inequalities in the users' transmit powers (see, e.g., [41] - [48] ). Building on this approach, classical scalar power control problems are by now well understood, as they can be elegantly recast as a convex optimization problem [47] - [51] or as a so called \standard" problem (in the sense of [42, 44] ), and centralized [48] - [50] and distributed (either synchronous or asynchronous) algorithms [42] - [47] , [51] , are available.
The game theoretical formulation proposed in this paper is much more complicated, since it falls in the class of vector problems, where each user has a set of variables (multiple degrees of freedom)
to optimize. For the class of vector problems, the QoS requirements can not be written in terms of constraints on the SINR of each channel (see (4)), and thus none of the results of [42] - [51] can be applied in a useful way.
As far as the literature on the vector power control is concerned, to the best of our knowledge, no previous work has dealt with distributed power control in Gaussian frequency-selective interference channels, including QoS constraints. A game theoretic approach for power control in DSL systems (modeled as Gaussian frequency-selective interference channels) was originally proposed in [4] and then further investigated in [5] - [22] . The authors in [4, 5] considered the competitive maximization of the information rates of the links, given constraints on the transmit power. The game of [4, 5] is formally de ned as
with sinr q (k) given in (4). It is well known that the game in (13) always admits a NE for any given set of channel transfer functions and power constraints, and all the NEs are the solutions of the following simultaneous water lling set of equations [ 5] - [22] p 
where WF q ( ) is de ned as in ( 10), with the water-level q chosen to satisfy the power constraint
Comparing the solutions in (12) with those in (14), one infers that a relationship between our game G and that in (13) exists. Speci cally, a NE p ? of the game (13) induces a rate pro le R ? ; the pair (p ? ; R ? ) is then a GNE of G . Conversely, a GNE of the power minimization game is a NE of (13) if the right-hand side N in the budget constraint is replaced by an appropriate budget. However, in spite of this interesting relationship, none of the results known for the game (13) can be used to study the game G . In fact, it is straightforward to see that the existence (uniqueness) of a NE of (13) does not imply the existence (uniqueness) of a GNE of G for arbitrary users' rate constraints, since there is no guarantee that any given rate pro le in G could be reached as NE of ( 13) with a proper users' power budget. What makes the study of the game G more complicated than that of (13) is the coupling among the admissible strategy set of the users, due to the presence in (8) of the rate constraints. Because of this coupling, the approach followed, e.g., in [16] , by which the original Nash problem is formulated as a Mixed Linear Complementary Problem (MLCP) [26, 54] can not be used directly. Indeed, in contrast to such a \linear" formulation of (13), the proposed game (8) is a genuinely nonlinear problem whose detailed study is an open problem until now.
To take into account possibly QoS constraints on the information rate of each link, in [4] the authors proposed an empirical algorithm based on the sequential IWFA that attempts to achieve a set of target rates for all the users. The algorithm in [4] runs in two stages. The inner stage solves the rate maximization game (13) , for a given set of transmit powers for all the users. The outer stage adjusts empirically each user's transmit power based on the outcome of the inner stage. Unfortunately, the scheme in [4] is not guaranteed to converge, even when the NE of (13) is unique. Moreover, the algorithm in [4] tacitly assumes that the target rates can be achieved solving the Nash problem (13), for a proper users' power budget, an assumption that does not hold in general.
The approach introduced in this paper di ers from [ 4] as our game theoretical formulation takes explicitly into account the rate constraints in the optimization. In our approach, we obtain simple (su cient) conditions to check the feasibility of any given users' rate pro le and guaranteeing the uniqueness of the solution and the global convergence of the proposed distributed algorithms.
Existence and Uniqueness of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium
In this section we rst provide su cient conditions for the existence of a nonempty and bounded solution set of the Nash equilibrium problem (6) . Then, we focus on the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium
Given the rate pro le 
: (15) Su cient conditions for the nonemptiness of a bounded solution set for the game G are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4
The game G with rate pro le R ? = (R ? q ) Q q=1 > 0 admits a nonempty and bounded solution
. . .
Proof. See Appendix B.
A more general (but less easy to check) result on the existence of a bounded solution set for the game G is given by Theorem 23 in Appendix B.
5 A matrix A 2 R N N is called P-matrix if every principal minor of A is positive [53, 54] . Many equivalent characterizations for a P-matrix can be given. The interested reader is referred to [53, 54] for more details. Here we note only that any positive de nite matrix is a P-matrix, but the reverse does not hold.
We provide now alternative su cient conditions for Theorem 4 in terms of a single matrix. 
We also denote by e R ? 1 the Q-vector with q-th component e 
Proof. See Appendix C.
To give additional insight into the physical interpretation of the existence conditions of a GNE, we introduce the following corollary.
Corollary 6 Su cient conditions for the matrices fZ k (R ? )g de ned in ( 15) to be P-matrices are:
Proof. The proof comes directly from the su ciency of the diagonally dominance property [ 55] for the matrices Z k (R ? ) in (15) to be P-matrices [53, 54] .
Remark 7 A physical interpretation of the conditions in Theorem 4 (or Corollary 6) is the following.
Given the set of channel transfer functions and the rate constraints, a GNE of G is guaranteed to exist if the links are su ciently far apart. In fact, from ( 20) , which quanti es the concept of \su ciently far apart", one infers that, for any xed set of channels and rate constraints, there exists a minimum distance beyond which an equilibrium exists, corresponding to the maximum level of interference that may be tolerated from each user. The amount of such a tolerable multiuser interference depends on the rate constraints: the larger the required rate from each user, the lower the level of interference guaranteeing the existence of a solution. The reason why an equilibrium of the game G might not exist for any given set of channels and rate constraints, is that the multiuser system we consider is interference limited, and thus not every QoS requirement is guaranteed to be feasible. In fact, in the game G , each user acts to increase it transmit power to satisfy its own rate constraint; which leads to an increase of the interference against the users. It turns out that, increasing the transmit power of all the users does not guarantee that an equilibrium could exist for any given rate pro le.
Remark 8
The conditions in Theorem 4 provide a simple admission control procedure to check if a set of rate constraints is feasible. In this light, according to the relationship between the rate maximization game of [4] and our power minimization game (cf. Section 3.1), the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of the power minimization game can be rephrased as follows. Under the conditions of Theorem 4, one can always nd a power budget for all the users such that there exists a NE of the rate maximization game that satis es the rate constraints.
Uniqueness of the Generalized Nash Equilibrium
Before providing conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G , we introduce the following intermediates de nitions. For any given rate pro le
with p r 0 (k) de ned in (16) . We also introduce and ; de ned respectively as 
Su cient conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G are given in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 Given the game G with a rate pro le R ? = (R ? q ) Q q=1 > 0; assume that the conditions of Theorem 4 are satis ed. If, in addition, B(R ? ) in (21) is a P-matrix, then the game G admits a unique GNE.
Proof. See Appendix E.
More stringent but more intuitive conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE are given in the following corollary.
Corollary 10 Given the game G with rate pro le
so that a GNE for the game G is guaranteed to exist, with de ned in (23) . Then, the GNE is unique if the following conditions hold true
with de ned in ( 24) .
In particular, when 2 r (k) = 2 q (n); 8r; q 2 and 8k; n 2 N ; conditions ( 27) become 
Proof. See Appendix F.
Remark 11
The game G contains, as special cases when N = 1, classical SINR based power control problems in at-fading CDMA (or TDMA/FDMA) systems, as detailed next. In the case of at-fading channels with one degree of freedom for each user (i.e., N = 1), the game G falls in the class of scalar power control problems, where the goal of each user is to reach a prescribed SINR (see (4) ) with the minimum transmit power P q [41] . . . .
with Z(R ? ) de ned as in (15), where each jH rq (k)j 2 is replaced by the at channel transfer function jH rq j 2 : By directed product of results obtained for the game G ; we have the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Given the rate pro le
; the problem (31) admits a nonempty solution set if and only if Z(R ? ) is a P-matrix. Moreover, the solution, whenever it exists, is unique.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Interestingly, the condition given in Proposition 12 is equivalent to that known in the literature for the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the classical SINR based power control problem (see, e.g., [41] ). Moreover, observe that, in the case of N = 1; the solution of the game G ; coincides with the upper bound in (16).
Distributed Algorithms
The game G was shown to admit a GNE, under some technical conditions, where each user attains the desired information rate with the minimum transmit power, given the PSDs at the equilibrium of the others. These GNEs, when they exist, are the solutions of the set of nonlinear equations in (12) . In this section, we focus on algorithms to compute these solutions. Since we are interested in a decentralized implementation, where no signaling among di erent users is allowed, we consider totally distributed algorithms, where each user acts independently to optimize its own PSD while perceiving the other users as interference. More speci cally, we propose two alternative totally distributed algorithms based on the water lling solution in (9), and provide a uni ed set of convergence conditions for both algorithms.
Sequential iterative water lling algorithm
Since all the GNEs of the game G are xed points of the water lling mapping de ned in ( 9) (see (12) ), to achieve these equilibria by a sequential iterative algorithm, it is natural to employ a Gauss-Seidel scheme (by which, each user's power is sequentially updated [30] ) based on the mapping (9). The sequential Iterative Water lling Algorithm (IWFA) we propose is indeed based on this simple idea:
Each player, sequentially and according to a xed updating order, solves problem ( 8), performing the single-user water lling solution in (9). for n = 0 : Number of iterations;
end
Remark 13
The main features of the proposed algorithm are its low-complexity and distributed nature. In fact, despite the coupling among the users' admissible strategies due to the rate constraints, the algorithm can be implemented in a totally distributed way, since each user, to compute the waterlling solution (9) , only needs to locally measure the PSD of the interference-plus-noise (see (4)) and water ll over this level.
The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed under the following su cient conditions.
Theorem 14
Assuming Number of iterations = 1, the sequential IWFA, described in Algorithm 1, converges linearly to the unique GNE of the game G , if the conditions of Theorem 9 are satis ed.
Proof. See Appendix G.
Remark 15
Observe that the convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed under the same conditions obtained for the uniqueness of the solution of the game. As expected, the convergence is ensured if the level of interference in the network is not too high.
Remark 16
In [4] , an empirical algorithm with no convergence guarantee was proposed to accommodate possibly QoS constraints (cf. Section 3.1). Di erently from [ 4] , the sequential IWFA given in Algorithm 1 solves the Nash equilibrium problem satisfying the rate constraints under conditions of Theorem 14, still keeping the nice properties of the iterative water lling algorithm for the rate maximization problem, namely its low complexity and its distributed nature.
Remark 17 Despite its appealing properties, the sequential IWFA described in Algorithm 1 may su er from slow convergence if the number of users in the network is large, as we will also show numerically in Section 5.2. This drawback is due to the sequential schedule in the users' updates, wherein each user, to choose its own strategy, is forced to wait for all the other users scheduled before it. It turns out that the sequential schedule, as in Algorithm 1, does not really gain from the distributed nature of the multiuser system, where each user, in principle, is able to change its own strategy, irrespective of the update times of the other users. Moreover, to be performed, the sequential update requires a centralized synchronization mechanism that determines the order and the update times of the users. We address more precisely this issue in the next section.
Simultaneous iterative water lling algorithm
To overcome the drawback of the possible slow speed of convergence, we consider in this section the simultaneous version of the IWFA, called simultaneous Iterative-Water-Filling Algorithm. The algorithm is an instance of the Jacobi scheme [30] : At each iteration, the users update their own PSD simultaneously, performing the water-lling solution ( 9) , given the interference generated by the other users in the previous iteration. The simultaneous IWFA is described in Algorithm 2. for n = 0 : Number of iterations
end Remark 18 Since the simultaneous IWFA is still based on the water lling solution ( 9) , it keeps the most appealing features of the sequential IWFA, namely its low-complexity and distributed nature.
In fact, as in sequential IWFA, also in simultaneous IWFA each user only needs to locally measure the PSD of the interference received from the other users and water-pour over this level. In addition, thanks to the Jacobi-based update, all the users are allowed to choose their optimal power allocation simultaneously. Hence, the simultaneous IWFA is expected to be faster than the sequential IWFA, especially if the number of active users in the network is large.
Interestingly, (su cient) conditions for the convergence of the simultaneous IWFA are the same as those required by the sequential IWFA, as given in the following.
Theorem 19
Assuming Number of iterations = 1, the simultaneous IWFA, described in Algorithm 2, converges linearly to the unique GNE of the game G , if the conditions of Theorem 9 are satis ed.
Proof. See Appendix G. Numerical Example. As an example, in Figure 1 , we compare the performance of the sequential and simultaneous IWFA, in terms of convergence speed. We consider a network composed of 10 links and we show the rate evolution of three of the links corresponding to the sequential IWFA and simultaneous IWFA as a function of the iteration index n as de ned in Algorithms 1 and 2. In Figure 1a) we consider a rate pro le for the users with two di erent classes of service; whereas in Figure 1b ) the same target rate for all the users is required. As expected, the sequential IWFA is slower than the simultaneous IWFA, especially if the number of active links Q is large, since each user is forced to wait for all the other users scheduled before updating its power allocation.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the distributed power allocation in Gaussian frequency-selective interference channels, subject to QoS constraints. More speci cally, we have proposed a new game theoretic formulation of the power control problem, where each user aims at minimizing the transmit power while guaranteeing a prescribed information rate. We have provided su cient conditions for the nonemptiness and the boundedness of the solution set of the Nash problem. These conditions suggest a simple admission control procedure to check the feasibility of any given users' rate pro le. As expected, there exists a trade-o between the performance achievable from each user (i.e. the information rate) and the maximum level of interference that may be tolerated in the network. Under some additional conditions we have shown that the solution of the generalized Nash problem is unique and we have proved the convergence of two distributed algorithms: The sequential and the simultaneous IWFAs.
Interestingly, although the rate constraints induce a coupling among the feasible strategies of the users, both algorithms are totally distributed, since each user, to compute the water lling solution, only needs to measure the noise-plus-interference power spectral density. Our results are thus appealing in all the practical distributed multipoint-to-multipoint systems, either wired or wireless, where centralized power control techniques are not allowed and QoS in terms of information rate must be guaranteed for each link.
Of course there are many open directions that are worth of further investigations. Both the sequential and the simultaneous IWFAs, even distributed, require some form of centralized synchronism, either in the transmission or in the users' updating process. Recently, in [21, 22] , the authors showed that both the sequential and the simultaneous IWFAs that solve the rate maximization game are just special cases of a more general uni ed framework, given by the totally asynchronous IWFA. In this more general algorithm, the users update their own power spectral density in a completely distributed and asynchronous way (in the sense of [30] ). Furthermore, the asynchronous setup includes also another form of lack of synchronism where the transmission by the di erent users contains time and frequency synchronization o sets. This feature makes the asynchronous IWFA appealing for all practical scenarios where strong constraints on synchronization cannot be met. Similarly to [21, 22] , it will be interesting to generalize the algorithms we have proposed in this paper to the case of asynchronous transmission and totally asynchronous updates among the users.
Appendices

A Proof of Lemma 1
First of all note that the objective function of the convex problem (8) is coercive on the feasible set. Hence at least one solution exists. Since the problem satis es Slater's condition [ 24] , the KKT conditions are both necessary and su cient for optimality. If we denote by q;k the multipliers of the nonnegativity constraints and by q the multipliers of the rate constraint, the KKT conditions can then be written as:
where a ? b means the two scalars (or vectors) a and b are orthogonal. Observe now that q > 0; otherwise complementarity yields p q (k) = 0 for all k 2 N , which contradicts the rate constraint.
Hence, the rate constraint at the optimum must be satis ed with equality. If p q (k) = 0; since q;k 0;
Since, for each k; the values of the admissible solution induce a partition on the set of the q values, the solution can be written as
where q is chosen to satisfy the rate constraint in (34) with equality. Since all the p q (k) are increasing functions of q , it is easy to verify that there is one and only one value of q that makes (34) satis ed.
The water-level q in (35) can be computed as follows. With p q (k) given in (35) , and
the problem (34) is equivalent to the piecewise equation:
which can now be solved by simply sorting the N positive scalars q (k)= jH(k)j 2 :
and determining an integer ' 2 f0; 1; 2;
; N 1g such that
With the integer ' determined in (38), we obtain the water-level q :
q , exp 2 6 6 6 6 6 4
This completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 4
We derive Theorem 4 as a corollary to the more general Theorem 23 below. In order to prove this theorem we need several preliminary concepts and results though, as given next.
B.1 Noiseless game
We rewrite rst the KKT optimality conditions of the Nash problem ( 8) as a Mixed nonlinear Complementarity Problem (MNCP) [26, 54] . Starting from (34) , eliminating the multipliers f q;k g corresponding to the nonnegativity constraints and making some obvious scaling, the KKT conditions of the minimization problems in (8) are equivalent to the following MNCP:
To proceed further we introduce an additional game, which has the same structure of the game G , except for the players' payo functions, de ned as in ( 3), but with 2 q (k) = 0 for all k 2 N and q 2 .
We will refer to this game as the noiseless game. Although the noiseless game does not correspond to any realistic communication system, it will be shown to be instrumental in understanding the behavior of the original game G when all 2 q (k) > 0.
Note that the conditions 2 q (k) > 0 ensure that all the users's rates R q (p q ; p q ) in (3) of the G in (8) are well-de ned for all nonnegative p , (p q ) Q q=1 , with p q , (p q (k)) N k=1 : Nevertheless, when 2 q (k) = 0 , the players' payo functions 6 R q (p q ; p q ) of the noiseless game still remain well-de ned as long as P Q r=1 p r (k) > 0, provided that we allow for a rate equal to 1. Most importantly, the MNCP (39) is well de ned for all nonnegative 2 q (k), including the case when 2 q (k) = 0 for all k 2 N and q 2 . The latter observation leads to the following de nition.
De nition 20 A set of user powers p ,
; is said to be a GNE of the noiseless game if there exists a set of nonnegative scalars fv q g Q q=1 such that
We call these equilibria noiseless equilibria, and denote the set of noiseless equilibria by N E 0 .
Physically we can think of the noiseless equilibria as an approximation of the equilibria of the original game, that will be more and more accurate as the users' powers become larger and larger with respect to the noise variances. We therefore expect that the noiseless game and the concept of noiseless equilibrium will help understanding the behavior of the original game G when the powers are large.
The set N E 0 of users' noiseless equilibria constitutes a closed, albeit not necessarily convex, cone in the space of all users' powers. A noteworthy point about such an equilibrium is the following simple property, which asserts that in the noiseless game, every carrier will be used by at least one user.
Proposition 21
If p 2 N E 0 , and p 6 = 0; then
Proof. Let p 2 N E 0 be such that p q 0 (k 0 ) > 0 for some pair (q 0 ; k 0 ). By complementarity (see (40)),
we have
which implies
since the jH qr (k)j 2 are all positive. Equation (42) clearly implies:
as claimed by the proposition.
B.2 The noiseless asymptotic cone
Another mathematical concept we need is that of asymptotic direction of a (nonconvex) set that we borrow from recession analysis [52] .
Given the game G with rate pro le R ? , (R ? q ) Q q=1 , it is possible that the sets of powers p that allow the user to achieve this rate be unbounded. In essence, the asymptotic consideration below aims at identifying such unbounded user powers. Speci cally, we consider the following noisy nonconvex level set of users' powers corresponding to R ? :
for some sequence of scalars f g 1 =1 tending to 1 and some sequence of powers f p g 1 =1 such that
It is known [52, Proposition 2.1.2] that P (R ? ) is bounded if and only if P 1 (R ? ) = f0g. Whereas the individual sets P (R ? ) are dependent on 2 q (k), it turns out that the asymptotic cones of all these sets are the same and equal to the following noiseless level set of users' powers:
0 :
where by convention the vacuous summation is de ned to be zero (i.e., by de nition, P 0 (R ? ) contains the origin). The claim about the equality of
is formally stated and proved in the result below.
Proposition 22 For any
) and f(p ; )g be a sequence satisfying the de nition of d in (44) . For each q 2 and all , we have
Taking the limit ! 1 establishes the inclusion
Conversely, it is clear that 0 2 P (R ? ). Let d be a nonzero vector in P 0 (R ? ). For any scalar > 0, we have, for all q 2 ;
Hence d 2 P (R ? ) for all > 0. It follows that d 2 P 1 (R ? ).
We are now ready to introduce the key object in our proof of Theorem 23, the cone N E 0 \ P 0 (R ? ), which by Proposition 22, is equal to
B.3 Existence results
With the above preparation, we are ready to present our main existence theorem. The emptiness of Proof. We rst note that the KKT conditions of the Nash problem de ned in ( 8) are equivalent to the following nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP)
which are essentially the concatenation of the KKT conditions of the single-user power minimization problems (8) (see (34) and comments thereafter). In turn, to show that (48) has a solution, it su ces to prove that the solutions of the augmented NCP
for all > 0 are bounded [26, Theorem 2:6:1].
We show the latter boundedness property by contradiction. Assume that for some sequence of positive scalars f g, a sequence of solutions f(p ; )g exists such that each pair (p ; ) satis es:
and that
From (49), it is clear that q > 0 for all and q. In fact, if a q = 0, then by the rst complementarity condition, p q (k) = 0 for all k, which is not possible by the last inequality in (49).
Thus, it follows from the second complementarity condition that
which implies that the sequence f q g is bounded for each q 2 . We claim that lim !1 = 0.
Otherwise, for some subsequence f : 2 g, where is an in nite index set, we have lim inf (2 )!1 > 0. Thus, the subsequence f q : 2 g is bounded for all q 2 . The rst complementarity condition in (49) then implies that fp q (k) : 2 g is bounded for all q 2 and k 2 N . This is a contradiction to (50) . Therefore, the sequence f g # 0.
Consider now the normalized sequence fp =kp kg, which must have at least one accumulation point; moreover, any such point must be nonzero. Let d 1 be any such point. It is not di cult to show that d 1 is a nonzero noiseless equilibrium. Moreover, from the inequality:
which is implied by (51), it is equally easy to show that
, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the existence of a solution to the problem (39). The boundedness of such solutions can be proved in a similar way via contradiction and by the same normalization argument. The details are not repeated.
Roughly speaking, the key condition d N E 0 (R ? ) = ; in the previous theorem is just the mathematical requirement that if the power p goes to in nity staying feasible, the system cannot approach a (noiseless) equilibrium. As such the previous theorem is rather natural, although it does not provide an e ective way of checking the existence and boundedness of the solutions. To this end, however, we can now easily derive Theorem 4 from Theorem 23.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
In order to prove Theorem 4 we introduce a simple polyhedral set that will turn out to be a subset of P (R ? ).
which is independent of the and where, we recall, the matrices Z k (R ? ) are de ned by (15) . The key property for the existence Theorem 4 is stated in the following proposition.
Proof. It su ces to note the following string of implications:
where the middle equivalence is by simple exponentiation.
It is known that, since each matrix . This follows easily from the following two facts: 1) any solution p of (39) must belong to the set P (R ? );
2) a Z-matrix that is also a P-matrix must have a nonnegative inverse.
C Proof of Corollary 5
Consider the matrix Z max (R ? ) de ned by (17) in Corollary 5, and assume it is a P-matrix. Set
. The rst assertion in the Corollary is immediate because
where the inequality is intended component-wise. Therefore, since all the matrices involved are Zmatrices, from the assumption on Z max (R ? ); it follows that all the Z k (R ? ) are also P-matrices [53, 54] .
Lets now prove the bounds (19) . Note rst that
Furthermore we recall that, by (55) and [54] , we have [
, and also that the inverse of a matrix that is P and Z is nonnegative [54, Theorem 3:11:10] . From all these facts, and recalling (16), the following chain of inequalities easily follows for every k 2 N :
which provides the desired bound (19) .
D Proof of Proposition 12
We prove that the following three statements are equivalent for the linear system of equations (31):
(a) The problem has a nonempty solution set; 
E Proof of Theorem 9
The study of the uniqueness of the solution of the GNEP is complicated by the presence of a coupling among the feasible strategy sets of the users, due to the rate constraints. To overcome this di culty we rst introduce a change of variables of the game G , from the power variables p q (k) to a set of rate variables, in order to obtain an equivalent formulation of the original generalized Nash problem as a
Variational Inequality (VI) problem, de ned on the Cartesian product of the users' rate admissible sets. Then, building on this VI formulation, we derive su cient conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the original game. It is important to remark that our VI formulation of the game G di ers from that of [16] . In fact, in [16] the rate maximization game was formulated as an A ne VI de ned on the Cartesian product of the users' power sets [16, Proposition 2] . Our VI instead, is de ned by a nonlinear function, which signi cantly complicates the uniqueness analysis, as detailed next.
E.1 VI formulation
Hereafter we assume that conditions of Theorem 4 are satis ed, so that a GNE of the game G is guaranteed to exist.
Given the game G we introduce the following change of variables:
with r q (k) satisfying the constraints r q (k) 0; 8k 2 N , 8q 2 ; and
Observe that each r q (k) = 0 if and only if p q (k) = 0: Given r(k) , (r q (k)) Q q=1 ; let us de ne the Z-matrix
Z k (r(k)) , 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
From (59), we have Z k (r(k)) Z k (R ? ) for all k 2 N , where Z k (R ? ) is de ned in (15) . It follows that each Z k (r(k)) is a P-matrix [53, 54] .
According to (58), the users' powers p(k) , (p q (k)) . . .
Observe that ( Z k (r(k))) 1 is well-de ned, since Z k (r(k)) is a P-matrix.
Using (59) and (61), and the fact that each p q (k) = 0 if and only if r q (k) = 0, the KKT conditions of the Nash problem (8) can be rewritten as (see (39)):
where r (k; r(k)) denotes the r-th component of (k; r(k)); de ned in ( 61). It is easy to see that (62) is equivalent to (note that as usual q > 0 for any solution of (62)), 8k 2 N , 8q 2 ,
Let us de ne
with r q , (r q (k)) N k=1 . Observe that each q (k; r(k)) in (64) where U is the Cartesian product of users' rate sets, de ned as
and is the continuously di erentiable function on [0; R ? ] N de ned in (64).
By de nition, it follows that a tuple r ? , (r ? q ) Q q=1 is a solution of the VI(U; ) de ned above if and only if, for all r q 2 U q and q 2 ;
We rewrite now condition (66) in a more useful form. To this end, let introduce (34) (i.e., any GNE of the game G we
and p r (k) de ned in (16) . It follows that
Using (67), we can write
so that condition (66) becomes
where q (k; p ? (k)) is de ned in (67) and
; with each p ? q (k) = q (k; r ? (k)); and q ( ) given in (61). Condition (70) will be instrumental for the study of the uniqueness of the GNE, as shown next.
E.2 Uniqueness analysis
Building on (70), we derive now su cient conditions for the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G .
; for = 1; 2; be any two solutions of the Nash problem in (8) . Given = 1; 2, k 2 N ; and q 2 ; let us de ne
Adding the following two inequalities, which are obtained from the characterization (70) of a solution to the VI (U; ):
and rearranging terms, we obtain
where b
; for = 1; 2; and log(b ( ) q ) has to be intended as the vector whose k-th
Invoking the mean-value theorem for the logarithmic function, we have that there exists some scalar
and, for each q 2 and k 2 N ,
Similarly, there exists some scalar ! q (k) such that
and, for each q 2 and k 2 N , log(b
Introducing
and using (76) and (78), the inequality (74) becomes
By the triangle inequality and rearranging terms, from (80) it follows v u u t
We bound now (81) using the following: 8q 2 ; 8k 2 N ,
where (82) follows from (59), (83) from (75) and (82), (84) 
where: (86) follows from (83) and (84); (87) follows from (82), (84) and (85); and in (89) we have de ned 
and let B be the \comparison matrix" of B, i.e., the matrix whose diagonal entries are the same as those of B and the o -diagonal entries are the negatives of those of B (see ( 21)). Note that B is a Z-matrix.
with " q (k) de ned in (79), and concatenating the inequalities in (86) for all q 2 ; we deduce
with t , (t q ) Q q=1 . If B is a P-matrix, then it must have a nonnegative inverse. Thus, by (94), we have t 0; which yields t = 0: This proves the uniqueness of the GNE, under conditions of Theorem 9.
Remark 25 An alternative approach to establish the uniqueness of the solution of the Nash problem (8) is to show that under a similar hypothesis, the function (r) in ( 64) is a \uniformly P-function" on the Cartesian product set U . In turn, the latter can be proved by showing that the Jacobian matrix J (r) of the function (r) is a \partitioned P-matrix" uniformly for all r 2 U . We adopt the above proof because it can be used directly in the convergence analysis of the distributed algorithm to be presented subsequently.
F Proof of Corollary 10.
To prove the desired su cient conditions for B(R ? ) in (21) to be a P-matrix, we use the bounds (19) in Corollary 5, as shown next.
We provide rst an upper bound of each b qr (k), de ned in (91).
with Z max (R ? ) given in (17) and
. By (19), we have
2 N ; 8q; r 2 ; and q 6 = r;
where q (k) is de ned in (68). Introducing (96) in (91), we obtain
5 ; 8k 2 N ; 8q; r 2 ; and q 6 = r:
Hence, recalling the de nitions of the constants (assumed in (0; 1)) and 1; as given in (23) and (24), respectively, we deduce 
where max qr is de ned in (22) .
From (98), one infers that condition (27) implies that B(R ? ) in (21) is diagonally dominant, which is su cient to guarantee the P-property of B(R ? ) [54] , and thus the uniqueness of the GNE of (8) (Theorem 9).
It remains to show that (28) is equivalent to (27) if 2 q (k) = 2 r (k); 8r; q 2 and k 2 N . In this case, (27) 
which is clearly equivalent to (28) .
G Proof of Theorem 14 and Theorem 19
The proof of the convergence of both the sequential and simultaneous IWFAs is similar to the proof of the uniqueness of the GNE of the game G as given in Appendix E. The di erence is that instead of working with two solutions of the GNEP (and showing that they are equal under certains conditions), we consider the users' power allocation vectors produced by the algorithms in two consecutive iterations and derive conditions under which their respective distances to the unique solution of the game contract under some norm.
We focus rst on the convergence of the simultaneous IWFA. Then, we brie y show that a similar analysis can be carried out also for the sequential IWFA. Throughout the following analysis, we assume that conditions of Theorem 9 are satis ed.
G. 
with (n) q (k) , q (k; p (n) (k)); where p (n) (k) , (p (n) q (k)) Q q=1 and q (k; p (n) (k)) is de ned as in (67).
According to the simultaneous IWFA, at iteration n+1; the power allocation p 
or equivalently (see (70)), for all q 2 and n = 0; 1; : : : ;
where U q is de ned in (65 
and, for all k 2 N , q 2 ; and n = 0; 1; : : : ;
Moreover, there exists some scalar ! (n)
and, for all k 2 N , q 2 ; n = 0; 1; : : : ; log(
Introducing the vector t (n) , (t 
with q (k) given in (68) and using (106) and (108), (104) 
where (A) denotes the spectral radius of A. Therefore, by (110) and (111), the sequence ft (n) g contracts under a certain matrix norm; hence it converges to zero. The claimed convergence of the sequence fp (n) g follows readily.
G.2 Convergence of sequential IWFA
The convergence of the sequential IWFA described in Algorithm 2 can be studied using the same approach as for the simultaneous IWFA. The di erence is the nal relationship between the error vectors in two consecutive iterations of the algorithm. More speci cally, using the vectors t (n) , (t 
In (112) we used the fact that, under the P-property of the Z-matrix Diag fB(R ? )g Low fB(R ? )g (due to the fact that all its principal minors are less than one), the inverse (Diag fB(R ? )g Low fB(R ? )g ) 1 is well-de ned and nonnegative entry-wise [ 54, Theorem 3:11:10].
According to (113), the convergence of the sequential IWFA is guaranteed under the spectral condition ( ) < 1;
which is equivalent to the P-property of B(R ? ) [54, Lemma 5.3.14], with B(R ? ) de ned in (21) .
